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2026-11-17

HighPrimary

Nanobot Agent-Selected Shell Escaped bwrap and Copied a Protected Canary

Tenable reports a controlled Nanobot agent shell-override bypass that copied an out-of-workspace canary before bwrap containment. Fixed in version 0.4.1.

NanobotTool execution / MCPControlled agent-mediated shell-override sandbox bypassNanobot >= 0.2.1 and < 0.4.1 using restrictToWorkspace=true and sandbox=bwrap

What happened

The researcher directs the agent to write and select a workspace shell; Nanobot launches that shell outside bwrap, and it copies a protected canary under the non-root nanobot account.

Why it matters

A controlled out-of-workspace host-file copy was reported. The advisory describes access to host resources available to the service account; it does not establish a malicious campaign, root access or customer-secret theft.

Missing authorization check

Independent validation of the effective interpreter identity, executable provenance and filesystem scope before launching any agent-selected process.

Would PP block it?

A gate mediating the actual host executable could bind approved interpreter identity, arguments and filesystem scope to delegated authority. Basename-only approval is insufficient. This advisory does not test Permission Protocol or establish a prevention result.

Incident analysis

Timeline and technical read

Timeline

  1. 2026-09-28

    Tenable reports the issue through GitHub.

  2. 2026-11-04

    Tenable confirms additional fixes; the vendor reports the fix merged into main pending release.

  3. 2026-11-06

    The disclosure timeline records release of the fix in Nanobot 0.4.1.

  4. 2026-11-17

    Tenable publishes TRA-2026-68.

Technical breakdown

  • The default write_file and sandboxed exec tools operate inside the workspace; the agent can use them to stage an executable named bash.
  • For an absolute shell path, _resolve_shell checks the filename and executable bit and returns the path unchanged.
  • _prepare_command wraps the command argument with bwrap, but _spawn launches the workspace interpreter itself on the host before containment.
  • The staged interpreter copies an out-of-workspace canary and then invokes /bin/bash; the override returns zero while the requested command still runs.
  • Tenable reports the shared spawn path also affects persistent exec sessions. Model compliance is required; no independent reproduction was performed for this record.

Authorization boundary

Where the authorization boundary should have been

This incident is categorized as Tool execution / MCP. The relevant Permission Protocol gate is Runtime Gate. The read is conditional: the block only applies where the real action boundary is routed through a gate.

If enforced at
Host process-launch boundary before the effective interpreter executes
Still needs
Interpreter integrity, sandbox placement and complete filesystem mediation remain necessary. An escaped process or unmediated host action cannot be constrained by a gate it bypasses.
Receipt required for
Launching the exact interpreter with specified arguments and authorized filesystem access

An externally integrated execution boundary could reject an unapproved workspace interpreter, but a gate inside the escaped harness would not provide complete containment.

Start small

Put the relevant gate at this action boundary.

This incident maps to Runtime Gate. Start with the boundary that controls the actual action, then require a signed receipt before execution.

Replay this incident with a signer in the loop