Actor
The agent or automation that requested the action
Technical guide · Updated September 2, 2026
An immutable audit receipt is a tamper-evident record created for a specific AI agent action. It binds the exact action and payload to the agent, policy decision, named human signer when approval is required, timestamp, and cryptographic signature. It lets an auditor verify who authorized what before execution.
The useful distinction is authorization before execution versus observation after the fact.
The agent or automation that requested the action
The stated purpose and action category
A hash of the command, change, message, or transaction
The repository, environment, resource, or workflow affected
Cleared, approval required, founder veto, or denied
The named human who approved a consequential action
Issuance, decision, expiry, and execution timestamps
Cryptographic proof that detects later modification
The receipt is useful only when enforcement verifies it before the protected action proceeds.
Policy evaluates the exact requested action and context.
Low-risk work clears by policy; consequential work routes to a named signer.
The enforcement point verifies the receipt, scope, payload hash, signature, and expiry before execution.
An immutable audit receipt is a tamper-evident record created for a specific AI agent action. It binds the exact action and payload to the agent, policy decision, named human signer when approval is required, timestamp, and cryptographic signature. It lets an auditor verify who authorized what before execution.
An audit log records that an event occurred. An authority receipt proves that a particular action was evaluated and authorized under a specific policy before execution. The receipt binds the signer and decision to the exact action payload, so a later edit or different action cannot reuse the approval undetected.
No. Low-risk actions can be cleared automatically by policy, while consequential actions route to a named human signer and prohibited actions are denied. Every path should still produce evidence showing which policy made the decision.
A correctly designed receipt cannot authorize a different payload. The receipt includes a cryptographic hash of the approved action and scope. Verification fails when the payload, commit, repository, environment, or other bound context changes.
Permission Protocol gates consequential agent actions and produces a signed receipt naming the actor, policy, payload, and accountable signer.
Watch the blocked-action flow