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2026-11-18

MediumPrimary

SkillCFI Tests Show Agents Executing Procedurally Forbidden Operations Through Allowlisted Tools

Controlled SkillCFI experiments show agents using allowed tools to bypass workflow prerequisites, approval branches and content bindings in Linux containers.

OpenCode with GLM-5.3-FlashGovernance bypassControlled research on agent workflow violations, not a covert prompt-injection campaignNo production incident: author-written procedural skills and helpers in fresh Linux containers

What happened

Agents proposed qualified violating requests after lawful histories; baseline handlers executed them, including workflow writes, sends and deletion operations in the controlled test setup.

Why it matters

No production impact established. The paper reports controlled target effects and invalid completion states; it does not establish real recipient delivery, customer data loss or deployment-wide failure rates.

Missing authorization check

A pre-dispatch check binding the exact operation and object to trusted prerequisite results, the current workflow state and the applicable user decision.

Would PP block it?

Protection would require trusted workflow policy, reliable helper results, authenticated decisions where human authority is needed, exact object binding and mediation of every effect-producing channel. A tool allowlist or an approval detached from current state is insufficient. SkillCFI workflow contracts alone do not establish authenticated human authority.

Incident analysis

Timeline and technical read

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-18

    The authors publish arXiv v1 describing the controlled SkillCFI experiments.

Technical breakdown

  • Eight author-written skills supply two normal and two abnormal tasks each; a synthetic user gives fixed answers.
  • The main cohort uses GLM-5.3-Flash in OpenCode 1.18.35 with fresh Linux containers.
  • The allowlist admits in-vocabulary requests without checking workflow order, outcome-dependent branches or object bindings.
  • All 80 qualified abnormal targets under each baseline were dispatched and took effect; SkillCFI blocked 240 across three refusal-message conditions.
  • Targets include writes before approval, unapproved content, sends after keep-draft decisions, deletion after failed verification and invalid completion claims.

Authorization boundary

Where the authorization boundary should have been

This incident is categorized as Governance bypass. The relevant Permission Protocol gate is Tool-Call Gate. The read is conditional: the block only applies where the real action boundary is routed through a gate.

If enforced at
The host tool-call boundary before handler dispatch, with workflow state and correlated results outside the model context
Still needs
Trusted skills and helpers, complete mediation and serialized single-skill sessions are prerequisites. Harmful content in a permitted sequence, hidden script effects, concurrency and multi-skill composition remain outside the demonstrated guarantee. Direct violation requests are not evidence of covert prompt-injection success.
Receipt required for
The exact proposed write, send or deletion, bound to current prerequisite evidence, approved content and the relevant decision

An independently integrated action gate could enforce exact approved scope and prerequisite evidence, but this paper does not evaluate Permission Protocol.

Start small

Put the relevant gate at this action boundary.

This incident maps to Tool-Call Gate. Start with the boundary that controls the actual action, then require a signed receipt before execution.

Replay this incident with a signer in the loop